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Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying




The government's interest in ending discrimination is one "of the highest
order."1 In an effort to end discrimination in the workplace, Congress passed Title
VII, making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of an
employee's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"2 and other laws
prohibiting discrimination based on age' and disability Such laws give an
employee who has been discriminated against in the workplace access to the
judicial system in order to remedy the situation.
A ministerial employee who experiences discrimination, however, does not
have a right to a judicial remedy. While Congress did not intend to insulate
religious organizations,5 courts have consistently held that the application of anti-
discrimination laws to religious organizations and their ministerial employees
would prove a violation of the First Amendment.' This exception, commonly
referred to as the "ministerial exception," applies even when a religious
organization claims no religious justifications for its alleged discriminatory
actions. Courts have held that applying anti-discrimination laws in such cases
would interfere with religious organizations' autonomy in deciding their own
internal affairs in violation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and
would result in excessive entanglement in violation of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause.7
This Note will attempt to show that the Constitution may not necessitate an
exception to Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws in cases in which the
religious organization offers no religious justification for discriminatory
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1. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1984).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
3. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. S. § 623 (Law. Co-op.
1990 & Supp. 1998).
4. See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
5. This Note interchanges the use of the terms "religious organization" and "church"
throughout. Both terms are used generically to include any religious organization or
denomination unless otherwise specifically noted.
6. See, e.g., Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184,
187-88 (7th Cir. 1994); Raybum v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1167-72 (4th Cir. 1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-61 (5th Cir.
1972).
7. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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employment action.8 Part I briefly looks at the discrimination that exists in
religious organizations and then discusses the court-made ministerial exception
to anti-discrimination statutes and the limitations placed on this exception. Part
II examines relevant Supreme Court decisions and argues that these decisions
leave ample room for allowing courts to hear ministers' claims of discrimination.
In addition, Part II also criticizes the lower courts' response to these Supreme
Court decisions in ministerial discrimination cases. Part III examines court
decisions in other kinds of cases involving ministers and churches and compares
them to ministerial discrimination cases.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Anti-discrimination laws have proven an important tool in helping to eradicate
discrimination in the workplace. This Part will briefly examine the importance of
anti-discrimination statutes and give an overview of courts' reasoning in deciding
that ministerial employees should not be afforded the protections of such statutes.
A. Anti-Discrimination Legislation-Its Importance,
Applications, and Legislative Exemptions
The Supreme Court has stated that the government has a compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination and its effects.9 In enacting Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Congress decreed that the policy of outlawing discrimination
in the workplace should be one of "'highest priority."" Congress intended to
prohibit any form of discrimination in the workplace that would create inequality
in employment opportunity." Discrimination in the employment setting had
become a serious problem, with approximately fifty percent of those seeking jobs
8. This Note will not attempt to argue that churches with bona fide discriminatory beliefs
should be subject to anti-discrimination statutes. A religious organization that discriminates
with no religious justification allows that organization to "secretly" engage in discriminatory
conduct while claiming to have non-discriminatory practices and beliefs. Thus, members of the
congregation and clergy tend to believe that their church does not discriminate, and can do
nothing to change discriminatory actions that they do not know about. On the other hand,
members of churches that openly discriminate, such as the Catholic Church's refusal to ordain
women, have chosen to be a part of such a church with full knowledge of its beliefs and
practices. Thus forcing such religious organizations to comply with anti-discrimination statutes
may truly interfere with not only the churches' free exercise rights under the First Amendment,
but also with the rights of individual members who have chosen to be apart of the organization
and adhere to its beliefs and practices. In addition, because members of such religious
organizations have full knowledge of the church's practices, they can work to change them if
they choose to do so.
9. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149, 167 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1986) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion).
10. Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (quoting Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)).
11. See id.
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suffering from some sort of discrimination. 2 Unequal employment opportunities
had resulted in increased welfare assistance costs and higher dropout rates among
disillusioned high school students. 3 Thus, discriminatory actions in the
employment setting harmed both individuals and society in general. Title VII and
later anti-discrimination statutes were passed not only to help individuals harmed
by discrininatory action, but to improve society in general.
Discrimination in the workplace does not lose its sting simply because the
employee being discriminated against is a ministerial employee in a religious
organization. In fact, such discrimination may be even more harmful to the
individual than discrimination in the secular world. As one scholar has pointed
out, religion provides spirituality and can be an important source of identity. 4 By
allowing religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of sex, race, age,
disability, etc., clergy who have been discriminated against come to view religion
as both spiritual and oppressive.' In addition, religion plays an important role in
shaping political views. 6 By excluding individuals from religious leadership,
religious organizations exclude them from an important avenue of political
access. 7 The fact that approximately 12.3% of clergy members are female, while
11.2% are black demonstrates the fact that few women and minorities have the
opportunity to influence politics through the pulpit.'
Discriminatory practices exist in religious organizations today. Some, like the
Catholic Church's refusal to ordain female priests, are based on the Church's
religious beliefs and doctrine.' 9 Discriminatory practices exist, however, even in
religious organizations that have no religious justification for their actions. For
example, women clergy in The Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) with five
to nineteen years of experience earn approximately $5000 less than male clergy
with similar experience.2" Another example is found in the United Methodist
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-1370, pt. 2, at 1 (1962).
13. See id. at2.
14. See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for
Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1049, 1091
(1996).
15. See id at 1092.
16. See id at 1092-94. Rutherford writes:
Religious groups often become directly or indirectly involved in the moral issues
that dominate public debate. Religions are key political players. They have long
been influential on the most important political concerns from abolition, to
desegregation, to abortion. Religious organizations not only take stands on
important issues, they also often become involved in politics directly. Clergy
members have run for and held political office, and conservative Christian groups
have taken control of several state Republican Party organizations. Consequently,
religious groups are sources of political power and influence.
Id. at 1092-93 (citations omitted).
17. See id. at 1094.
18. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNrrED STATES 410
(1997).
19. See Elisabeth S. Wendorff, Employment Discrimination and Clergywomen: Where the
Law Has Feared to Tread, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 135, 139 (1993).




Church, where "clergywomen report salary disparities, glass ceilings, and
discrimination in the hiring process."'"
Claims brought by clergy members also illustrate the prejudices that can exist
in religious institutions. For example, in Young v. Northern Illinois Conference
of United Methodist Church,'2 Young, a female African-American, had allegedly
received excellent references and ratings during her four years as a probationary
minister for the United Methodist Church in Chicago.' Despite excellent reviews,
the church denied her a promotion to become an "Elder," and dismissed her as a
minister in the church.24 The church's review panel criticized Young's preaching
skills without, according to Young's complaint, ever hearing her preach.25 Thus,
despite a seemingly excellent record as a minister, the church denied Young a
position as an Elder and fired her for no apparent reason. The possibility that such
a denial was due to either racial or sexual discrimination, or both, seems very
probable.
Congress did not exempt religious organizations from liability for such
apparent discriminatory actions, but it did create two specific exemptions for
religious organizations. The religious corporation exemption, section 702 of Title
VII, exempts a religious organization from an employee's claim of discrimination
based on religion.26 This exemption applies to employees whose duties are
secular, as well as employees who have duties connected to the religious mission
of the organization. Similarly, the religious school exemption28 allows
educational institutions that are substantially owned, controlled, or supported by
a religious organization to "hire and employ" persons of a particular religion.29
While allowing religious employers to discriminate based on religion, Congress
refused to extend such an exemption to discrimination based on sex, race, color,
or national origin.3" The courts, however, overruled Congress's intent by
establishing the "ministerial exception."
21. ld. at 146.
22. 818 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. II!. 1993), aft'd, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994).
23. See id. at 1207.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
27. See id. § 2000e-1. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this exemption
in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
29. Id.
30. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that while
Title VII specifically exempted religious institutions from liability based on religious
discrimination, Congress specifically declined to expand this exemption to discrimination
based on race, color, sex, or national origin).
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B. The "Ministerial Exception" and the Courts' Refusal
to Protect Clergy From Discrimination
Despite Congress's intent, courts have consistently held that the First
Amendment bars civil courts from resolving discrimination suits brought by
clergy members.3' Courts have based their creation of this "ministerial exception"
on both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.
1. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause32 prevents the government from placing an
impermissible burden on religious beliefs. The government can burden religion
in two ways: (1) by interfering with an individual's religiously motivated conduct
or practice,33 or (2) by interfering with the internal affairs of a church?' The right
of churches to be free from governmental interference in their internal affairs is
commonly referred to as the "church autonomy" doctrine. The central theme in
the church autonomy doctrine is that "churches have a constitutionally protected
interest in managing their own institutions free of government interference."3
The Supreme Court, however, has differentiated between beliefs and actions,
noting that the freedom to believe is "absolute," but the freedom to act "remains
subject to regulation."3 6 The kind of governmental interest needed to burden
religious activities has been the subject of much controversy. Before 1990, the
general consensus was that even for a neutral regulation, one not meant to burden
religion but having an incidental, burdensome effect nonetheless, the government
must demonstrate a compelling interest that would justify the burden placed on
free exercise rights.37
In McClure v. Salvation Army, the first case to establish the ministerial
exception, the Fifth Circuit used the compelling interest test to determine if a
Title VII action brought by a ministerial employee was constitutionally
permissible. 8 In McClure, the plaintiff, an ordained minister of The Salvation
Army, brought an action against The Salvation Army, a religious organization,
31. See id. at 558-61; see also Young v. Northern I1l. Conference of United Methodist
Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1994); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356-58 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn v. General Conference
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-71 (4th Cir. 1985).
32. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
33. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,460 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-33 (1993)).
34. See id. (citing Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church,
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
35. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 1373, 1373
(1981).
36. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); see also Rutherford, supra note
14, at 1118 ("IT]he Court never has held that religious liberties are unlimited.").
37. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 558-59.
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alleging that she had received a lower salary and fewer benefits than her male
counterparts and that she had been released from her employment after she
complained to her superiors and the EEOC. 9 While recognizing that Congress did
not intend to exclude religious employers from liability for sexual
discrimination,40 the court, nevertheless, concluded that holding a religious
organization liable for discrimination in this case would violate the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.4 The court noted that "[t]he relationship between
an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood, ' 42 and that resolving such
a discrimination case would necessarily force the court to intrude upon the
internal matters of the church.43 In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit failed
to even consider the state's interests in ending discrimination, concentrating
almost exclusively on the apparent burden to religion.
The McClure court's "ministerial exception" to Title VII has since been
followed by nearly every court that has faced the same issue. Unlike the McClure
court, some of these courts have taken into account the balancing test usually
employed in free exercise analysis, 44 and have considered the government's
competing interest in ending discrimination.45 Such courts, however, have decided
that churches' rights to autonomy in their dealings with their ministers outweigh
the right of a minister to be free from discrimination.46
39. Id. at 555.
40. See id. at 558.
41. See id. at 560.
42. Id. at 558.
43. See id. at 560 (Applying Title VII to the employment relationship between a minister
and its employer "would involve an investigation and review of these practices and decisions
and would, as a result, cause the State to intrude upon matters of church administration and
government.").
44. See, e.g., Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1127 (Colo. 1996).
45. Note that such a balancing test may no longer be necessary after Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, in which the Court held that a neutral law with an
incidental effect on religion is constitutional so long as the law does not have a religious
purpose. 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990). However, courts' continuous refusal to apply Smith to
claims of employment discrimination suggest that they are still balancing interests by using the
compelling interests test. See discussion infra Part II.A.
46. See Young v. Northern III. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185
(7th Cir. 1994) ("[U]n a direct clash of 'highest order' interests, the interest in protecting the
free exercise of religion embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution prevails over the
interest in ending discrimination embodied in Title VII.") (quoting Rayburn v. General
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)); see also Van
Osdol, 908 P.2d at 1127 ("Where the clergy member alleges a violation of civil law by the
church in the appointment process, courts have repeatedly found that the church's interest in
free exercise outweighs the government's interest in enforcing the particular statute.").
[Vol. 74:269
COURT ACCESS TO MINISTERIAL EMPLOYEES
2. Establishment Clause
Courts have also used the Establishment Clause47 to justify the ministerial
exception to Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws.4" The Establishment
Clause addresses the necessity of neutrality in the relationship between
government and state.49 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,50 the Supreme Court created a
three-part test to determine if a statute violates the Establishment Clause: "First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' 51
Despite the growing debate about whether the Lemon test is still the proper test
in the Establishment Clause analysis,52 lower courts have continued to use it in
evaluating ministers' claims of discrimination. While Title VII and other anti-
discrimination statutes clearly pass the first two prongs of the Lemon test, courts
have consistently held that resolving discrimination suits by clergy members
would excessively entangle the government in religious affairs.53 The excessive
entanglement question involves considerations such as "the character and purpose
of the institution involved, the nature of the regulation's intrusion into religious
administration, and the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority."54 Even when a church does not claim a religious justification
for an employment decision, courts have found that it would be impossible to
evaluate claims of discrimination without drawing the court into matters of church
doctrine, faith, and governance."5
The difficulty in resolving ministerial discrimination cases without becoming
excessively entangled seems to be the result of the importance courts have placed
on allowing churches to make their own decisions regarding who is qualified to
be a minister. The D.C. Circuit has noted that the "determination of 'whose voice
speaks for the church' is per se a religious matter. We cannot imagine an area of
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion....").
48. It should be noted that the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
sometimes involve very similar analysis because some courts fail to distinguish the two clauses,
while others attempt to distinguish them by using the term "burden" for Free Exercise Clause
analysis and "entanglement" for Establishment Clause analysis, although there is no
distinguishable difference between the two terms. See Laycock, supra note 35, at 1378-79; see
also discussion infra Part II.B.1.
49. See, e.g., Whitney Ellenby, Divinity vs. Discrimination: Curtailing the Divine Reach
of Church Authority, 26 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 369, 389 (1996).
50. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
51. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
52. See infra note 118 (discussing the status of the Lemon test).
53. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1994).
54. Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1132 (Colo. 1996) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-
15).
55. See Himaka v. Buddhist Churches of Am., 917 F. Supp. 698, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see
also Catholic Univ. ofAm., 83 F.3d at 466.
1998]
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inquiry less suited to a temporal court... ."6 The courts' refusal to make any sort
of inquiry gives churches free reign in their decisionmaking regarding ministerial
employees.5 7
C. Limits of the Ministerial Exception
While allowing religious organizations to discriminate against clergy members
at will, courts have limited the ministerial exception, applying the exception to
only ministerial employees and refusing to extend it to nonministerial employees.
For example, in DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School,"8 the Second Circuit held
that adjudicating a lay teacher's claim of age discrimination against a parochial
school would not excessively entangle the court in religious matters and therefore
would not violate the First Amendment. The court noted that the inquiry required
in such a case would be limited, and that even if the school offered a religious
justification for its decision, challenging the justification as a pretext for an
impermissible reason would not involve the court in evaluating the truthfulness
of a religious doctrine.59 Other courts have come to similar conclusions regarding
nonministerial employees.60
Because courts have refused to expand the ministerial exception to non-
ministerial employees of religious organizations, the difficulty in some cases has
been in deciding whether a particular employee fits into the ministerial or non-
ministerial category.6' While a minister of a church clearly falls into the
ministerial category, a church administrator or other employees with some secular
56. Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354,
1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Minker v.
Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 699 F. Supp. 954, 955 (D.D.C.
1988)).
57. See, e.g., Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184,
187 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In other words, religious bodies may make apparently arbitrary decisions
affecting the employment status of their clergy members and be free from civil review having
done so.").
58. 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993).
59. See id. at 171.
60. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982)
(finding that a female editorial secretary at a church-affiliated publishing house was not in a
position similar to that of a minister); Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1992).
In Welter, the University had justified its decision to terminate four nuns' teaching contracts
on an order of the Roman Catholic Church, and was thus, motivated by religious concerns.
Finding that the nuns' duties were not of an "extra religious.. . status," the court held that the
University should be held to the same standards as any other employer and could be found
liable under Title VII (the nuns taught computer science). Id. at 215.
61. See Ellenby, supra note 49, at 372.
The courts' position with respect to non-ministerial functions, however, remains
unclear ... In the absence of any meaningful guidelines from the Supreme Court,
lower courts, which must determine the religious nature of an employee's
position, must rely upon standards set by previous courts grappling with this
issue. This method of resolving discrimination disputes has led courts to reach
different conclusions on ostensibly similar facts.
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and some religious duties present a more difficult question.62 Courts faced with
the question of whether an employee is a ministerial employee have generally
looked at such factors as whether the employee has been ordained by the church,
acts as an intermediary between the church and the congregation, performs
functions of the sacrament, or serves as a church governor.63 In those cases where
the court has determined that the employee served mostly secular duties, claims
of discrimination have been allowed to go forward.' Even when religious
organizations give religious reasons for their actions, courts have held that in the
case of a secular employee, the First Amendment does not preclude an inquiry
into whether the religious reason given was simply a pretext for unlawful
discrimination against the employee.65
II. IS THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION CONSTITUTIONALLY
MANDATED? HINTS FROM THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the judicially created ministerial
exception. The Court, however, has dealt with other types of Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause cases, and the language in these cases suggests that the First
Amendment may not mandate the ministerial exception. This Part will look at
some of these Supreme Court cases and examine the holdings and language that
may allow civil courts to hear discrimination suits brought by clergy members
without violating the First Amendment.
62. See e.g., Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 839 F. Supp. 680, 681-82 (E.D.
Mo. 1993) (stating that the administrator of a Jewish Temple is a ministerial employee because
of his religious duties).
63. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283-84
(5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993); Shirkey v.
Eastwind Community Dev. Corp., 941 F. Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that the job of
community developer was not a ministerial position, even though the United Methodist Church
had developed and approved the project). Oddly, while courts have held that a judicial
determination of whether non-religious reasons for employment action in regards to clergy
would involve impermissible entanglement, determining whether someone is a ministerial or
nonministerial employee has not been viewed as impermissible entanglement. See id at 577-78.
But see Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 343-44 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("What makes the application of a
religious-secular distinction difficult is that the character of an activity is not self-evident ....
A case-by-case analysis for all activities therefore would both produce excessive government
entanglement with religion and create the danger of chilling religious activity.").
65. See, e.g., DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 171 ("[I]n those cases where a defendant proffers a
religious purpose for its allegedly discriminatory employment action, a plaintiff will usually
be able to challenge as pretextual the employer's justification without calling into question the
value or truthflulness of religious doctrine."); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802,
809 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that a parochial school's religious reasons for firing an
unmarried pregnant librarian did not protect it from discrimination liability because if the
plaintiff was fired solely because of her pregnant condition, and not because she had committed
adultery, this would be discriminatory because only women can be fired for being pregnant).
1998]
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A. Smith, Free Exercise, and Lower Courts' Reactions
Seemingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources v. Smith66 should have an 'effect on how the ministerial
exception is viewed under the Free Exercise Clause. In Smith, members of the
Native American Church used the drug peyote for sacramental purposes and
challenged the Oregon law prohibiting the use of peyote. The Supreme Court held
that prohibiting the use of the drug peyote did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause even though the plaintiffs used the drug for sacramental,- religious
purposes. In its decision, the Court noted that the Free Exercise Clause "does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' 6s Thus, as clarified later, if a law has
an incidental effect on religious practices, but is a neutral law of general
applicability, the state does not need to demonstrate a compelling governmental
interest.6 Smith, therefore, did away with the previous balancing test. The ruling
seemingly made any neutral law valid, no matter what the effect on religion, so
long as the law is not cloaked in neutral terms only to cover up an intent to
specifically target a certain religion's practices.69
The Smith decision has been widely criticized."0 Justice O'Connor's opinion,
concurring in the judgment only, criticized the majority's opinion for rejecting
clear precedent and leaving minority religions with little protection.7 ' Congress
responded to the Smith decision by enacting the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act ("RFRA")."2 RFRA reinstated the compelling governmental
interest test which the court had overturned in Smith, stating that the government
was prohibited from burdening the exercise of religion, even if a law is neutral
and of general applicability, unless it can be demonstrated that the burden "(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that ... interest." 3
66. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
67. Id at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1981)) (parentheticals
in original).
68. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1992) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82).
69. See id. at 534. In Lukumi, the city of Hialeah had passed an ordinance prohibiting
animal sacrifice. The ordinance, however, excluded almost all killing of animals except for
those done for religious reasons. Id. at 536. The Court found that because the ordinance's
purpose was to target a specific religion, it was not neutral and must therefore, pass the strict
scrutiny test-it must "advance 'interests of the highest order' and must be narrowly tailored
in pursuit-of those interests." Id. at 546 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1977)
(quoting in turn Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972))). The Court found that the
ordinance in question failed to pass this test. See id.
70. See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91
(1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
71. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 892-903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment only)
(arguing that the statute would have been upheld under the compelling interest test).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-20000bb4 (1994).
73. Id. § 2000bb-l(b).
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The Supreme Court, however, has recently held RFRA unconstitutional,74 and
in the process, reiterated its holding in Smith.75 RFRA, however, may still apply
to Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination laws.76 The Court in Boerne held
only that RFRA is unconstitutional as it applies to state laws.77 The Court did not
rule on the constitutionality of RFRA as it applies to federal laws. Thus, some
lower courts have held that RFRA still applies to federal laws;78 therefore, a
neutral federal law may still have to pass the compelling interest test. Many
discrimination cases, however, are brought under both federal and state law, 79 as
many states have enacted their own anti-discrimination statutes.80 Thus, even if
Smith does not apply to federal laws because of RFRA, courts must still address
it when confronted with state law claims. How courts have dealt with Smith when
dealing with federal anti-discrimination laws, therefore, may still have
significance.
1. Lower Courts' Response to Smith
Despite Smith's holding that a neutral law incidentally affecting religion need
not be accompanied by a compelling governmental interest, lower courts have
still used the Free Exercise Clause to deny clergy members access to the courts.
Some of these courts have reached their decision by ignoring Smith or by relying
on RFRA.8 Still others have held that the reasoning in Smith does not apply to
Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes and, therefore, such statutes must
74. See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). The Boerne case
concentrated on the powers of Congress and noted that RFRA was meant to alter the meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause rather than enforce the Clause, id at 2164, and therefore, Congress
had exceeded its powers, see id. at 2171-72.
75. See id. at 2160-61, 2172 (explaining the Smith decision and declaring that "it is this
Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control").
76. See, e.g., Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998);
Gunning v. Runyon, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1423 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
77. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170-72.
78. See CrystalEvangelical, 141 F.3d at 859; Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1432-33.
79. See, e.g., Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894
F.2d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (asserting claims under both the ADEA and the Maryland
age discrimination statute); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(asserting a claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act).
80. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-9-1 (1998) (Civil Rights Law); id. § 22-9-2 (Age
Discrimination Law); id. § 22-9-5 (prohibiting discrimination based on disability); MINN.
STAT. § 363 (Supp. 1998) (Minn. Human Rights Act).
81. See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.
1991). The court simply stated that the Free Exercise Clause "prohibits the courts from
deciding cases such as this one," id at 363 (discrimination suit brought by minister), and that
"[p]ersonnel decisions by church-affiliated institutions affecting clergy are per se religious
matters and cannot be reviewed by civil courts," id. (emphasis in original). See also Powell v.
Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. Colo. 1994) (using the congressionally restored
compelling interest standard in holding that governmental interest in ending age discrimination
is not sufficiently compelling "in light of the fundamental right of a church to determine who




still pass the compelling interest test.82 Such lower court decisions severely limit
the Smith decision and give protection to churches which go beyond what the
First Amendment requires.
a. Narrowing Smith's Holding-It Applies
Only to Individuals, Not to Churches
One of the leading cases to confront the apparent confrontation between Smith
and the ministerial exception is EEOC v. Catholic University of America.83 In
Catholic University, Sister McDonough had been employed at the University as
a professor in the Canon Law Department. She applied for tenure but the
reviewing committee for such decisions rejected her application, citing such
reasons as "marginal performance in teaching and scholarly publications." 4 Sister
McDonough, however, felt that these reasons were pretextual and that the
University had engaged in sex discrimination.8 5 Sister McDonough argued that
even if she did qualify for the ministerial exception, the Smith case now required
that such an exception be eliminated.86 The court rejected this argument and
attempted to distinguish the case from Smith. First, the court said, the "burden on
free exercise that is addressed by the ministerial exception is of a fundamentally
different character from that at issue in Smith."8 " According to the court, the
ministerial exception was meant to protect the church, not individuals,88 thus
implying that Smith did not apply because it dealt only with neutral laws and
freedom of individuals. In addition, according to the court, the dangers involved
in letting an individual ignore a neutral law for religious reasons, which the
Supreme Court warned of in Smith, were not involved in the ministerial
exception." The Catholic University majority also noted that previous cases using
the ministerial exception have not necessarily depended on the compelling
interest test, but have relied on the fundamental right of churches that has been
recognized by the Supreme Court "'to decide for themselves, free from state
82. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
83. 83 F.3d 455.
84. Id. at 459.
85. See id. The D.C. Circuit noted that the ministerial exception was not limited to only
members of the clergy, but also applied "to lay employees of religious institutions whose
'primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship."' Id. at 461
(quoting Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th
Cir. 1985)).




Protecting the authority of a church to select its own ministers free of government
interference does not empower a member of that church, by virtue of his beliefs
to become a law unto himself. Nor does the exception require judges to determine
the centrality of religious beliefs before applying a compelling interest test in the
free exercise field.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine."' 90
Such a reading by the D.C. Circuit Court in Catholic University significantly
restricts the Smith holding and does not address the fact that some of the dangers
warned of in Smith may also be present in cases involving anti-discrimination
statutes and churches. For example, instead of allowing an individual to "become
law unto himself,"'" the ministerial exception allows a church to become a law
unto itself. What is unlawful for a secular employer, discrimination, is overlooked
when the employer is a religious organization and the employee is a clergy
member. Courts allow churches immunity from liability for discrimination even
when the church states no religious reason for its actions. Thus, in allowing a
church to escape scrutiny for possible discriminatory actions, courts give
religious organizations free reign to discriminate for any reason. The ministerial
exception does what the Supreme Court warned of in Smith-it opens
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic
obligations of almost every conceivable kind-ranging from compulsory
military service, . . to health and safety regulations such as manslaughter
and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws .... and traffic laws, to
social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws,
animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing for
equality of opportunity for the races.92
b. Other Supreme Court Decisions Relied
Upon by Lower Courts to Uphold the
Ministerial Exception
The court in Catholic University, as well as most other courts who have
addressed free exercise and discrimination, have relied on Supreme Court cases
which give churches the right to decide internal matters without governmental
interference. In the process, they have ignored and/or distinguished Smith.93 The
cases that these courts rely on, however, address different types of circumstances,
and clergy discrimination cases are seemingly distinguishable.
First of all, the Supreme Court cases relied upon by lower courts did not
involve generally applicable neutral statutes.94 For example, in Kedroff, the case
relied on by the court in Catholic University, the Supreme Court addressed the
90. Id. (quoting Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in
N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
91. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
92. Id. at 888-89 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
93. See, e.g., Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462 (citing Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116); Young v.
Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 186-88 (7th Cir. 1994)
(citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976)); Jocz v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 538 N.W.2d 588, 597 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995) (citing Milivojevich, 462 U.S. at 713, and Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116).
94. The court in Catholic University acknowledged this fact, but briefly did away with this
difference by stating "we cannot believe that the Supreme Court in Smith intended to qualify
this century-old affirmation of a church's sovereignty over its own affairs." Catholic Univ., 83
F.3d at 463.
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constitutionality of a New York law which "had the purpose and effect of
transferring the administrative control of the Russian Orthodox churches."95 The
case involved a dispute about the right to use and occupy church property in New
York City.96 The appellee relied on the New York statute, but the Supreme Court
held that the statute violated the First Amendment: "Legislation that regulates
church administration, the operation of the churches, the appointment of clergy,
by requiring conformity to church statutes ... prohibits the free exercise of
religion."97
The legislation that the Court referred to, however, was clearly a non-neutral
law. While Catholic University and other cases may rely on such a case to stand
for the proposition that churches have an unqualified right to have control over
who their clergy members are, the two situations involve differences that these
courts fail to sufficiently address, particularly in light of the Smith decision.
While the statute in Kedroffhad the specific purpose of deciding who controlled
a Particular church, anti-discrimination laws clearly have no similar religious
purpose.
Some courts have relied on Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United
States & Canada v. Milivojevich98 to uphold the ministerial exception. While this
case may be a closer match to clergy discrimination cases, it still has significant
differences that make it distinguishable.
The Milivojevich case involved a complicated fact pattern, in which the Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Church had a dispute over the control, property, and assets of
the American-Canadian Diocese.99 A suit was brought to determine if certain
proceedings of the Mother Church were consistent with the internal regulations
of the Church. The Supreme Court, however, held that resolving such an internal
dispute would violate the First Amendment.' According to the Court, the
Constitution mandated that "civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the
highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters
of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law.",0 '
The Seventh Circuit relied on this type of language to dismiss a discrimination
suit brought by Young,0 2 the African-American woman who was denied a
promotion and fired, despite excellent reviews.' 3 According to the court in
Young, "Milivojevich, read in its entirety, holds that civil court review of
ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals, particularly those pertaining to the
95. Kedroff 344 U.S. at 94 (both emphasis added).
96. See id. at 94-95.
97. Id. at 107.
.98. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
99. Id. at 698-99.
100. See id. at 708-09.
101. Id. at 713.
102. See Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 186-
87 (7th Cir. 1994).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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hiring or firing of clergy, are in themselves an 'extensive inquiry' into religious
law and practice, and hence forbidden by the First Amendment."' 4
This reading of Milivojevich, however, seems to expand the Supreme Court
decision well beyond what it was originally intended to mean. Resolving the
dispute in Milivojevich would have required the court to "'probe deeply enough
into the allocation of power within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide...
religious law.""0' 5 Milivojevich was clearly an extensive inquiry into the internal
decisions that would decide the very future of the church. Such an inquiry is very
different from the sort of inquiry needed to resolve a discrimination suit. In
addition, it should be noted that Milivojevich was decided well before Smith's




The Establishment Clause presents a more challenging problem for clergy
members wishing to bring discrimination suits. While the initial case which
created the ministerial exception relied on the Free Exercise Clause,'0 7 many other
courts have used both religious clauses,' 8 while others have based the ministerial
exception on the Establishment Clause alone.0 9 The excessive entanglement
prong of the three-part Lemon test is a very difficult obstacle in overcoming an
Establishment Clause defense to clergy discrimination cases."0 Excessive
entanglement analysis, however, may no longer be a proper test; and even if the
excessive entanglement test is used, as courts continue to insist on using it,
resolving claims of clergy discrimination does not necessarily violate such a test.
1. The Purpose of the Establishment Clause Compared to
Excessive Entanglement in Clergy Discrimination Cases
As the plain language of the First Amendment suggests, the Establishment
Clause was meant to prevent the government from establishing a religion, which
would seem to mean that the government cannot "help or aid religion.' The
Supreme Court has stated that the Establishment Clause prohibits "sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
104. Young, 21 F.3d at 187 (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709) (emphasis omitted).
105. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-09 (quoting Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (omission and alteration in original)).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
107. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).
108. See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.
1991); Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994).
109. See, e.g., Himaka v. Buddhist Churches of Am., 917 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
110. See, e.g., Wendorff, supra note 19, at 155 ("The third prong of inquiry, excessive
entanglement with religion, is also likely to prove an insurmountable obstacle in applying Title
VII to any religious employers of clergyvomen.").
111. Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of
the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 285, 300 (1994).
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activity.... As noted by Douglas Laycock, nothing in the history or language of
the Establishment Clause suggests that it is a "general ban on inhibiting
religion."".3 The Free Exercise Clause was originally intended to prevent undue
burden on religion, while the Establishment Clause was supposed to prevent
government from establishing religion through financial aid or other support.
According to Laycock, if the Establishment Clause is read as prohibiting the
government from inhibiting religion, the two religion clauses become
indistinguishable. "4
The lower courts, however, have blindly applied the Lemon test, concentrating
exclusively on the third prong, excessive entanglement, without considering the
fact that an exemption may have the purpose of advancing religion."' By holding
that adjudicating ministerial discrimination cases would result in excessive
entanglement with religion, courts seem concerned only with how discrimination
statutes inhibit religion, but ignore the fact that giving religious organizations an
exception to the statute may help or aid religion. As noted by one scholar,
however, "it is oxymoronic to claim that a regulation restricting religion
simultaneously establishes religion.' 6 Yet, by justifying their decisions in clergy
discrimination cases by using the Establishment Clause, this is exactly what
courts are claiming.
In fact, if one were to use the seemingly clear and literal meaning of the
Establishment Clause, that it prohibits government from promoting religion, the
ministerial exception, instead of being necessary under the First Amendment,
would actually seem to violate the First Amendment. After all, by allowing
religious organizations immunity from discrimination suits brought by their
clergy, courts give them an advantage that no secular employer enjoys. In
addition, as one commentator has argued, it is more likely that an exemption for
religious organizations in discrimination cases violates the Establishment Clause
and fails the Lemon test: "An exemption created expressly for religious
organizations clearly does not have a secular purpose. Similarly, it creates
religious effects by promoting discriminatory religious beliefs .... Finally, it
may entangle the government in religion if the state decides whether an employee
is engaged in religious activities.""..7 Thus, the plain meaning of the Establishment
112. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
113. Laycock, supra note 35, at 1382.
114. See id. at 1378-79.
[C]ourts and commentators have drawn distinctions [between free exercise and
establishment] without a difference, elaborately discussing whether religion was
burdened by the state under the free exercise clause, and then whether it was
entangled with the state under the establishment clause, with no identifiable
difference between "burden" and "entanglement."
The two clauses can be run together this way only at the risk of distorting their
meaning.
Id. (citation omitted).
115. See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 361-63
(8th Cir. 1991).
116. Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and a
Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 275, 298 (1994).
117. Rutherford, supra note 14, at 1110.
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Clause and the effect that the ministerial exception has in promoting religion,
seem to suggest that the Establishment Clause does not mandate the ministerial
exception, and in fact, it may even prohibit it.
2. Resolving Clergy Discrimination May Not Even Be
Excessive Entanglement
Even if the Establishment Clause applies to statutes that somehow inhibit
religion, a discrimination suit may still be able to overcome the excessive
entanglement prong,"' despite the lower courts' consistent refusal to see
otherwise.
The Supreme Court has authorized a "neutral principles of law" approach in
order to resolve internal church disputes." 9 The main case using this neutral
approach, Jones v. Wolf, involved a property dispute among factions of a
Presbyterian congregation in Macon, Georgia. The majority of the church had
decided to withdraw from its affiliation with the Presbyterian Counsel of the
United States, 20 creating a dispute about which faction had a right to control the
church property.' The Supreme Court held that a civil court could resolve the
dispute without violating the First Amendment by applying the neutral principles
of property law.' This could be done even if it involved an examination of
church documents, so long as the civil court takes "special care to scrutinize the
document in purely secular terms."'"
Lower courts have rejected the neutral principles of law approach in clergy
discrimination cases, even in cases where the religious organization has offered
no religious justification for its actions. For example, in Minker v. Baltimore
Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 4 Minker, a Methodist minister,
alleged that the church had refused to appoint him to a congregation which could
118. It should be noted that although it has not been specifically overruled, the Supreme
Court and critics alike have criticized the Lemon test. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon
Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REa. 795 (1993). In approaching Establishment Clause issues in
many of its recent cases, the Supreme Court has not used the Lemon test, but rather has
examined whether the government acted in a religiously neutral manner. For example, in
holding that the University of Virginia could not withhold student fees from student religious
groups, and that prohibiting the University from withholding these funds did not violate the
Establishment Clause, the Court stated that "[a] central lesson of our decisions is that a
significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause
attack is their neutrality towards religion." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995). Other anti-discrimination statutes would seem to pass such a
test, since they are clearly neutral, and their primary purpose is neither to promote or inhibit
religion. However, in Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997), the Court used both the
neutrality test and the Lemon test, thus, as one publication has stated, "add[ing] another layer
of confusion to its Establishment Clause jurisprudence," The Supreme Court, 1996
Term-Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 279 (1997).
119. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
120. See id. at 597-98.
121. See ide at 602.
122. See id. at 602-06.
123. Id. at 604.
124. 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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have paid him at a higher level of income solely on the basis of his age."iu Minker
argued that the church's Book of Discipline, which stated that appointments
would be made without regard to race, ethnic origin, sex, color, or age, had
created a contract which could be enforced in a secular court. 26 The court found
it seemingly impossible to interpret the Book of Discipline's simple
nondiscrimination passage without becoming involved in internal religious
matters.
In determining whether the Church has discriminated on the basis of age, a
court would be required to consider the religious purpose of the anti-
discrimination provision and to define its limits for the Church. The scope of
the Church's purported duty to not discriminate in its ministerial
appointments will inevitably require interpretations of provisions in the
Discipline that are highly subjective, spiritual, and ecclesiastical in nature. 2 7
The court went on to explain that resolving the age discrimination case would
necessarily involve the court in evaluating a minister's qualifications, which is an
ecclesiastical matter beyond the court's jurisdiction. 28
It may be true that resolving discrimination suits could involve an evaluation
of ministerial qualifications, which could even be considered entanglement of
some sort. However, "[n]ot all entanglements, of course, have the effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion.... Entanglement must be 'excessive' before it
runs afoul of the Establishment Clause."'129 Hearing the limited number of clergy
discrimination cases should not be considered excessive.-In addition, many kinds
of discrimination cases may be capable of being resolved without becoming
excessively entangled in church doctrine, yet most courts refuse to even consider
the possibility. For example, in McClure, the plaintiff claimed that she was paid
less than her male counterparts. 3 ' Such a claim can certainly be objectively
evaluated without becoming excessively involved in church doctrine by simply
evaluating the duties and wages of the church's employees. Also, in Young, the
plaintiff had received excellent reviews, yet the church suddenly decided that she
was not qualified to be a minister.'31 A court could have objectively looked at
Young's reviews that had been done by the church, and compared them with the
church's claims that Young was not qualified. Doing this would not have involved
125. See id at 1355. Included in Minker's complaint was an allegation that the bishop who
was responsible for pastoral appointments had said that the plaintiff "should not expect a new
better level appointment and that Methodist pastors in their fifties cannot expect growth
opportunities in new appointments." Id.
126. See id. at 1358.
127. Id. at 1359.
128. See id. at 1359. Similarly, in Catholic University, the D.C. Circuit asserted that to
evaluate Sister McDonough's qualifications as a Canon Law professor would involve assessing
her scholarly works which would necessitate judging whether her conclusions were in
agreement with Church teachings. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 466 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
129. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2015 (1997).
130. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972).
131. Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 818 F. Supp. 1206,
1207 (N.D. II. 1993), affd, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 74:269
COURTACCESS TO MINISTERIAL EMPLOYEES
the court in deciding whether a minister is qualified because it would be
objectively relying upon the church's own judgments.
By refusing to even consider the possibility of resolving clergy discrimination
cases, courts have ignored the strong public interest in resolving discrimination
disputes. Society has a strong interest in eradicating all discrimination:
[I]nterests being protected and enforced in civil rights actions are not only the
interests of the parties; substantial public and third-party interests are present
as well .... [T]he public interest tends to be much smaller in the typical
dispute involving church members' competing claims to church property or
church office, in which there is little external concern other than that the
dispute be settled peacefully.
3 2
Courts, however, have simply dismissed the public interest in ending
discrimination despite the fact that the neutral principles of law may be a
legitimate alternative in some cases.
III. LOWER COURTS' WILLINGNESS TO RESOLVE OTHER
TYPES OF CASES INVOLVING CHURCH CLERGY-IS IT
LEADING TO THE DEMISE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION?
Despite the lower courts' continuous refusal to hear ministerial discrimination
cases, many have been willing to hear other sorts of cases involving ministers,
discipline, qualifications, and other internal matters. The language in these cases
and some courts' willingness to allow investigation into some internal matters
suggests that it is possible that such cases may lead to a greater willingness to
hear discrimination cases involving ministerial employees. This Part will look at
such cases and compare their reasoning to the issue of ministerial discrimination.
A. Ministers and Contractual Disputes
Some courts have declined to dismiss an action brought by a clergy member for
breach of contract. For example, in Minker, the court held that a contractual
relationship between a minister and the church could be enforced in a secular
court."' Allegedly, the superintendent in charge of appointments had orally
promised Minker a better ministerial appointment as soon as possible, but this
never happened.'34 The court held that such a contract could be enforced,'35 but
cautioned that a court assessing Minker's claim must not inquire into any reasons
given by the church regarding Minker's qualification for pastorship that would
create an excessive entanglement. 3 6 The court noted, however, that it was
132. Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 408-09 (1987).
133. Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354,
1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
134. See id. at 1355.
135. Id at 1359 ("[C]hurches... 'may be held liable upon their valid contracts."') (quoting
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir.
1985)).
136. See id. at 1360.
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possible for Minker to show that an inquiry into his contract claims without
"impermissible avenues of discovery or remedies" was feasible.'37
While the court's holding in Minker is a narrow one, it does leave an open door
for at least some sort of protection for ministerial employees. While it may be
easy for a religious organization to claim some sort of religious reason for
dismissing a minister by questioning his or her qualifications, thus possibly still
foreclosing a remedy even under contract theory, the Minker case at least
recognizes that a claim by a ministerial employee can possibly be resolved
without excessive entanglement in religion.' In addition, ministers may be able
to protect themselves from future discriminatory actions by insisting on some sort
of employment contract.
B. Cases Involving Allegations of Sexual Abuse
An increasing number of suits have been brought by congregation members
against churches for their roles in negligently failing to take action to prevent
sexual abuse by clergy members. Lower courts are split on the issue of whether
or not the First Amendment divests secular courts of jurisdiction over such
cases.'39 While this Note makes no particular judgment about which circuit courts
have decided the issue correctly, it does appear that those courts which do allow
such claims to proceed are moving a step closer to allowing clergy members'
137. Id. The court also noted that "while the first amendment forecloses any inquiry into the
Church's assessment of Minker's suitability for a pastorship, even for the purpose of showing
it to be pretextual, it does not prevent the district court from determining whether the contract
alleged by Minker in fact exists." Id. at 1360-61.
138. Accord Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 681, 684
(I11. App. Ct. 1994) ("Enforcing vested secular, contractual rights is clearly different from
reviewing the subjective ecclesiastical personnel-appointment process of the church."); David
J. Overstreet, Note, Does the Bible Preempt Contract Law?: A Critical Examination ofJudicial
Reluctance to Adjudicate a Cleric's Breach of Employment Contract Claim Against a
Religious Organization, 81 MINN. L. REV. 263,passim (1996) (arguing that clergy's contract
claims should be allowed to be adjudicated in some cases). But see Lewis v. Seventh Day
Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 940, 942 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming the
dismissal of the minister's breach of contract claim).
139. Compare Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the
First Amendment barred the court from adjudicating claims of negligent hiring/supervision
because it would require the court to make "sensitive judgments" about supervision of clergy
in light of religious beliefs), and Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790
(Wis. 1995) (holding that the negligent hiring claim was barred by the First Amendment
because judgments about the qualifications of a priest would require an interpretation of church
doctrine and practices), with Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 81 (D.R.I. 1997) (holding
that where liability is predicated upon an alleged failure to take appropriate action to prevent
sexual assault by clergy, the First Amendment does not divest the court ofjurisdiction), and
Moses v. Diocese of Col., 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993) (stating that neutral principles of
law could be applied in resolving a suit for negligent hiring/supervision and breach of fiduciary
duty).
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discrimination suits.4 ' While ministerial discrimination cases and cases involving
clergy members and sexual abuse may seem very different, they both involve a
similar analysis of Free Exercise and Establishment issues and similar inquiries
into matters involving clergy members.
1. Free Exercise Issues in Sexual Abuse Cases Compared
Plaintiffs alleging that religious organizations are liable for sexual assault by
their clergy members have had to overcome Free Exercise arguments in order to
proceed with their claims. The courts that have allowed such claims to go forward
have held that neutral tort law can be used without violating the Free Exercise
Clause and that the Smith case requires that churches not be immune from neutral
laws of general applicability.' 4 ' Such a holding contradicts language in ministerial
discrimination cases which state that the Smith case applies only to individuals.
In O'Connell, the defendant Roman Catholic Church attempted to argue that the
conduct required by tort law conflicted with church doctrine.'42 Canon law, the
church argued, placed limits on the church's authority to discipline priests," and
the Catholic belief in redemption and forgiveness prohibited "church officials
from summarily taking action to punish priests who sexually abuse children."' 44
Thus, according to the Catholic Church, forcing the church to conform to the
standards of tort law would require them to deviate from church doctrine and
would violate the Free Exercise Clause. 4 s The district court, however, rejected
this argument stating that there was nothing to indicate that tort law and the
principles of the Church were incompatible.'46
In the alternative, the court noted that even if the principles of tort law and the
principles of the Catholic Church are incompatible, the law in Smith was
applicable.' 47 Thus, despite the church's argument that forcing them to comply
with tort principles would contradict its religious principles, the court stated that
this did not give the Church the right to engage in conduct prohibited by neutral
tort law. 4 1
140. This Part will only be comparing ministerial discrimination cases with those cases that
have held that secular courts can hear claims involving churches' liability for sexual assaults
by clergy members without violating the First Amendment.
141. See, e.g., Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 79 (D.R.I. 1997) (citing Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895 (1990)).
142. Id at 75.
143. See id. at 77-78.
144. Ide at 78.
145. See id. at 78-79.
146. See id. at 79 ("Briefly stated, there is no indication that, by taking the kind of
preventative action required by tort law, the hierarchy defendants would have violated any
'doctrine, practice or law' of the Roman Catholic Church.").
147. See id.
148. See id. The court also noted that "[i]ndeed, permitting some individuals to engage in
conduct proscribed by neutral laws that must be observed by everyone else simply because that
conduct emanates from a religious belief might be viewed as the kind of official recognition
of a religion that is prohibited by the establishment clause." Id. at 80.
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Such a holding may be significant to clergy discrimination cases. Many clergy
discrimination cases have upheld the ministerial exception based on the apparent
"fundamental right of churches" to decide matters of internal church government,
faith, and doctrine. 49 A decision like O'Connell, however, indicates that a neutral
law of general application can be applied to a church even if it somehow
interferes with the church's right to decide internal matters, such as how to
discipline a priest accused of sexual abuse. Surely, deciding whether to fire,
relocate, counsel, or take some other action in regards to a clergy member
accused of such acts is an internal matter involving the church and its clergy.
Requiring a church to conform to anti-discrimination laws may be no more an
interference in the internal matters of a church than requiring that actions taken
by religious organizations conform to neutral tort law in sexual abuse situations.
2. Establishment Clause
Like the Establishment Clause analysis in clergy discrimination cases,5 °
analysis under the Establishment Clause in cases involving sexual assault by a
clergy member also takes a closer look at the question of state interference in
internal matters.' Courts that allow such cases to proceed have held that neutral
principles of law can be applied that do not require interpretation of church
doctrine. 2 For example, in Jones v. Trane, an action for negligent
hiring/supervision, plaintiff alleged that church officials knew or should have
known that a priest was likely to commit sexual abuse but appointed him to a
position which gave him the opportunity to commit such acts.' The court held
that the action was not barred by the First Amendment because it is "conduct, and
not creed, that underlies plaintiffs' actions.'.. 4 Thus, inquiry into whether the
internal, disciplinary actions taken by the church were appropriate was not
considered excessive entanglement.
Similarly, in clergy discrimination cases, it is also "conduct and not creed" that
is at the heart of plaintiffs' actions. In most cases, the religious organization does
not put forth a religious justification for its actions. Rather, a church can use a
generic reason, such as questioning the minister's qualifications, and still be
immune from civil liability. While questions about a clergy member's
qualifications may involve some religious inquiry, it is the same sort of inquiry
about qualifications that must also be made in cases involving clergy misconduct,
yet this type of inquiry is allowed. While the two cases are clearly not identical,
the apparent ban on allowing civil courts to review internal church matters does
not always divest courts from jurisdiction in matters involving clergy sexual
149. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 47-57.
151. See, e.g., O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. at 73.
152. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 321 (Colo. 1993) ("[B]ecause the
facts of this case do not require interpreting or weighing church doctrine and neutral principles
of law can be applied, the First Amendment is not a defense.").
153. 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 928 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
154. Id. at 931.
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misconduct; therefore, such a ban is not absolute and may lead to a greater
willingness to hear clergy discrimination cases.
C. Sexual Harassment by Clergy Members
A cross between discrimination cases and those involving sexual assault by
clergy members are cases in which a clergy member alleges sexual harassment by
another clergy member. Despite the possible close similarity between such cases
and discrimination cases, at least one court has refused to allow the church to
escape liability under the First Amendment.
In Black v. Snyder, Black, an associate pastor of an Evangelical Lutheran
Church, filed numerous complaints against the church, including sexual
harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination.'55 Black alleged that she had
informed church officials that she was being sexually harassed by her supervising
pastor, but that after an investigation, nothing was done to stop the alleged
harassment. In addition, she also claimed that after filing a complaint with the
Minnesota Department of Human Rights, she was discharged in retaliation for her
actions.'56 While noting that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the court
from hearing Black's claims,'57 the court held that the Establishment Clause did
divest the court of jurisdiction over Black's breach of contract and retaliation
claims, noting that such claims were "fundamentally connected to issues of
church doctrine and governance and would require court review of the church's
motives for discharging Black."'5 8 The Establishment Clause did not, however,
prevent the court from hearing Black's charge of sexual harassment." 9 The court
noted that excessive entanglement is a "question of degree," and the degree of
intrusion necessary in resolving Black's sexual harassment claims presented "no
greater conflict with the church's disciplinary authority than that presented in
cases enforcing child abuse laws."' 60
Thus, even though an investigation into claims that a church failed to take
action for sexual harassment would surely require the court to at least inquire
about whether or not a church's actions regarding an internal dispute within the
church were appropriate, the court held that such an inquiry would not violate the
First Amendment. While the court refused to hear Black's other discrimination
155. 471 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
156. See id. at 718.
157. See id. at 719. This court is one of the few which has recognized that Smith is actually
applicable in a suit brought by a clergy member, and that a church is not immune from a neutral
law of general application: "Black's claims are not based on laws that expressly mandate or
prohibit religious conduct or beliefs, or involve additional constitutional rights. .. . Consistent
with Smith, proceeding on these claims does not violate the church's free exercise rights." Id.;
see also supra text accompanying notes 66-92 (discussing the impact of Smith).
158. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 720.
159. See id. at 720-21.
160. Id. at 721.
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claims, the possible adjudication of the sexual harassment claim may be one step
closer to allowing discrimination claims to be heard.'
CONCLUSION
Discrimination is a serious violation of one's right to equal treatment.
Discrimination in the workplace can have serious effects on both the individual
discriminated against, and society in general; thus we have devised laws to give
employees remedies for discrimination in the workplace. Clergy members,
however, do not enjoy such protections. Churches cloak themselves in the First
Amendment, leaving their employees susceptible to the arbitrary and
discriminatory actions of their employers. What gives churches a right to
discriminate without fear of liability is a question that does not have a clear
answer. Some courts have relied on the Free Exercise Clause, some on the
Establishment Clause, while other courts have relied on both clauses of the First
Amendment. The judicially created ministerial exception, however, may be
unnecessary because the First Amendment does not dictate that someone be
denied such protections simply because he or she is a ministerial employee.
Lower courts should consider the language of both Supreme Court holdings and
of the First Amendment more closely and entertain the possibility that despite the
general tendency to think otherwise, there may be a way to allow clergy members
to have their day in court.
161. Important in the court's conclusion was the fact that Black's remedy for her sexual
harassment claim was nonintrusive, in that she sought only monetary damages and not
reinstatement. See id. Thus, the church's right to choose its own pastor would remain intact.
It remains to be seen whether courts would be more willing to hear a discrimination claim
which similarly only seeks monetary damages.
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